the ci ilian 0 emment on some of these issues, ultimately the army's prefer nee dominate. It is difficult to parse what-if any-role Pakistan's citizen pla in haping these policies, in large part because the army has an inordinate role in shaping Pakistanis' beliefs about critical national securi affair. The result of the army's perduring and tenacious efforts to shape public opinion is that Pakistanis generally accede to the assessment of the arm and tend to support the army in its various activities.
After a e sing these structural issues, there is a more temporal assessment of hat we may expect from recent leadership changes in the army mo t notabl the recent retirement of Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Raheel hareef and the appointment of Lieutenant General Qamar Javed Bajwa as Pakistan s 16th COAS. Also briefly anticipated are what may be expected from the next general election scheduled for 2018. Ultimately, it is concluded that we should expect no significant positive change from Bajwa's leadership, and offer arguments that he may be even more aggressive with respect to domestic and foreign policies. At this juncture, it is difficult to discern who may emerge as the prime minister in 2018; however, it is unlikely to matter because the army will retain the ability to coerce that prime minister to do its bidding. It is concluded with a brief discussion of the implications of these arguments for American policy.
CiVil-Military Relations: Is Past Prologue?'
Pakistanis and analysts of Pakistan have long remarked, with more truth than hyperbole, that "generally countries have armies; but in Pakistan, the army has a country." Brigadier (Retd.) Abdurrahman Siddiqi observed the progressive subordination of Pakistan's "national identity and interest" to the "growing power of the military image."2 By way of explanation, he suggests that because:
There is no other institution to rival the military in organization and di~cip1ine,above all, in its control of the instruments of violence, its image ... reaches a P01?t of pr~do~-inance and power (... )sort of [P] russianism is born to produce an army WItha nation III place of a nation with an army. ' Because the Pakistan army is the largest and dominant service~"military dominated" in fact means "army dominated" even though Pakistan does have an air force and a navy as well as an arra of paramilitary organizations. The other services do not participate in go ming the country. Pakistan's generals (i.e. army chief, director of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (lSI), and the corps commanders) tep in overtly or covertly when they believe that the civilian order has fail d and that the army's intervention is required by virtue of its duty to the nation. The army also correctly believes that Pakistan's citiz nry will w lcome the intervention. In fact, Pakistanis generally have approved when the army chief seizes power and ousts popularly-elected leaders. Pakistan's encounters with military rule have followed a similar pattern.' The army chief seizes the government, suspends the constitution, i u a "Provisional Constitutional Order" (PCO), dismisses the parliament and requires the Supreme Court to justify the coup under the principle of the "Doctrine of Necessity" (Wolf-Phillips 1979) . The complicity of the upreme Court is profoundly important. Those justices that prefer to uphold their original oath to defend the Constitution are simply replaced with ju tices who will acquiesce. Because the election commission draws from the higher judiciary, when elections are at last held, they are conducted under the auspices of officials drawn from a highly-compromised cadre of judges.
Perhaps reflecting the army's understanding of the democratic preferences of their citizenry, Pakistan's military leaders have all sought to govern with a patina of democracy, albeit under the army's control. Thus, within a few years of the coup, the army chief, with the help of the intelligence agencies, cobbles together a "King's party," which draws from established mainstream political parties and new entrants seeking to take advantage of the military regime's patronage. In addition, the military uses its intelligence agencies to fashion an opposition of choice, usually comprised of Islamist political parties. Confident of an electable King's party and an Islamist opposition of choice, the regime holds invariably manipulated elections to install the King's party in government. The ensuing pro-military parliament then ratifies the various extra-constitutional orders issued by the army chief as president. Thi i an' terim rno e before the army regime must collapse completely, partI du to the pr ure of the military itself, and partly due to the popular unre t and c ncomitant public distrust that develops toward the military govemm n . The ann retreats from formal power and permits a weak democrati re t ration. In Pakistan, even though constitutionalism and democrac ha n r full fructified, Pakistanis do not embrace military authoritariani m 0 r long periods of time. The army can govern directly only for limited periods of time, and only with the facade of democratic institution. his is largely because the army fails to manage the state any better than the ci ilians they ousted, and because the army itself begins to resentth politi ization of the force and missed promotions (and thus forced retiremen ) of enior generals, which arise from the army chief's refusal to leave his po t, E ntually, the public demands a return to democracyhowsoe er imperfect or limited-and the army obliges in principle.
In the past, the army could be confident that democracy would remain under its thumb b cause Pakistan's military dictators left constitutional legacies that enabled the army to manipulate political affairs. For example, while the army was hesitant to allow Benazir Bhutto to become prime minister after Zia ul Haq's death, it was confident that it could keep her and her government in line due to a Zia-era constitutional measure: Article 58(2)(b) of the 1973 Constitution enacted with the Eighth Amendment. This provision allowed the president to dismiss the prime minister and the provincial chief ministers; dissolve the national and prOVincialassemblies; nominate judges to the superior judiciary; and appoint chiefs of the armed services. With the Eighth Amendment, Zia shifted the balance of power away from the position of the prime minister to that of the president.
Throughout the 1990s, no parliament served out its term due t.o early dismissal by the president under 58(2)(b). This occurred WIth the Connivance of the military (e.g. Benazir Bhutto's ouster in 1990 and that of Nawaz Sharif in 1993) and without (e.g. Benazir Bhutio's ouster m 1996 due to differences with President Farooq Leghari, also of the Pald~tan Peoples' Party (PPP)). No civilian government could muster the two-thuds maJonty to repeal this amendment until 1997 when Nawaz Sharif returned to power. With its repeal, Pakistan again returned to a parliamentary form of democracy but the interregnum was brief: Musharr af restored 58(2)(b) when he s:ized the government in October 1999. The so-called "58(2)(b)" remained in place until the Eighteenth Amendment was passed in April 2010 and again returned Pakistan to a parliamentary democracy, ' This antagonistic relationship between the military and the democratic parties is more reciprocal than it may seem at first blush. When opposition political leaders request help with weakening their opponents, the military often obliges." Because of this collusion between the military, politicians, judiciary, and bureaucracy, the first quasi-ctvilian government to serve out its entire five-year term was that elected under the auspices of President Musharraf. It should be noted that Musharraf had every incentive to keep this parliament in place as long as it served his purposes. In June 2004, Musharraf dismissed Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan J amali, who came into office following the October 2002 elections conducted under Musharraf's government. Musharraf replaced him with Shaukat Aziz, the American Citibank executive, who remained in that capacity until November 2007. In March 2013, when the previous PPP-led government stepped down to give way to a care taker government and fresh elections in May, it was the first wholly civilian government to serve out its term and be replaced by a constitutionally elected new government.
Given the army's ability to bring down a civilian government through direct or indirect intervention, few politicians are willing to take on the army. Most prefer to defer to the military in exchange for the chance to remain in power," There were a few notable historical examples of civilians who challenged the military. One example of this is the democraticallyelected but highly autocratic government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who served as prime minister from [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] . Bhutto managed to take advantage of the army's weakened position due to the national belief that the army was responsible for the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 war. However, by 1978, the army was back in power,"
Another example is that of Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo, app~inted Pr~me Minister by General Zia ul Haq following the 1985 elections, which were held on a non-party basis. Zia's amendments to Pakistan's constitution had weakened the powers of prime minister, Jaffrelot, Christophe Response categories included "extremely important," "very important," "moderately important," "slightly important," and "not important at all." While the concept of democracy is also complex and may be multi-faceted, a factor analysis confirms that the questions in this index capture a unidimensional concept of democratic values in Pakistan. We combined the six democracy questions into an index, scaled from 0 to 1. As Figure 1 (below) shows, there are high levels of support for democratic values among Pakistanis. As noted abo e, the Pakistan army cares very much about what its populace believes." Therefore the army invests significant effort domesticall to cultivate support for itself and concomitant disregard for civilian authorities. To do so, the army arrogates to itself a pre-eminent role in shaping Pakistan's educational curricula, textbooks, and the publicly and privately-owned media. II Second, the army is considerably occupied with domestic in ecurity, while also managing key relationships with the United States, China, Afghanistan, and India. Third, no matter how suboptimal it may find awaz Sharif, it has no less-odious alternative to him and his Pakistan Muslim League at present. Neither the Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) nor Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) are more palatable alternatives. Fourth, should the army intervene as it did in 1999, it will likely provoke sanctions from the United States, which is an important supplier of security assistance, though that assistance has declined in recent years. Finally, the army can accomplish what it wants with the current set up by undermining the prime minister, using a relatively new set of tools it developed first to weaken the PPP-led government and then to undermine Nawaz Sharif after his sweeping victory in 2013. The Army's New Playbook: Short-leashing Democracy"
The army's current means of short-leashing democracy wer manifest in its efforts to hobble the PPP-led government through a combination of judicial activism and orchestrated street theatre once th 1 th Amendment was ratified. One of the levers it used was the enmity between thenSupreme Court chief justice, Iftiqar Chaudhury, and Pr ident Zardari, which originated in 2008 when the PPP failed to support Chaudhury, whom Musharraf had ousted in March 2007. Zardari understood that Chaudhury would strike down an agreement that Musharraf had forged in late 2007 with his slain wife, Benazir Bhutto, while she lived abroad. That agreement-the National Reconciliation Ordinance ( RO)-suspended all corruption charges against PPP politicians by allowing them to contest elections. The NRO did not extend amnesty to the PPP's main rival, the Pakistan Muslim LeagueNawaz (PMLN).
The logic of the NRO was simple. Bhutto's popularity at the ballot box would restore Musharraf's dWindling legitimacy: she would serve as prime minister and he would remain on as president. Nonetheless, the NRO did not work for Musharraf because Bhutto was killed in a suicide attack in December 2007, and many believed Musharraf or his government was responsible. Musharraf's power waned despite U.S. support and in the fall of 2007, he resigned as army chief (but not as president) and appointed Ashfaq Parvez Kayani as his successor.
Nonetheless, he NRO still paved the way for a PPP victory in the 2008 elections. Since neither the PMLN nor the PPP had the votes to form a government on their own, and fearing that a failure to form a government would further undermine democracy and politicians in Pakistanis' eyes, the PPP and PMLN made the odd decision to form the government together. The coalition between the two longstanding nemeses was short-lived: the PMLN pulled out when the PPP resisted reinstating Chaudhury, and went on to launch massive protests against the PPP. Many observers believe that the months-long impasse was resolved by the then-COAS Kayani, who, fearing that the standoff between the two parties would cause the government to collapse, persuaded Zardari to reinstate the chief justice. Khan drew large crowds that spanned both genders as well as various age and ethnic groups. His self-proclaimed "tsunami" reinvigorated the electorate, and mobilized them on the themes of corruption, restoring Pakistani sovereignty, opposition to U.S. drone strikes, and scaling back military cooperation with the United States. While Khan was successful in luring away prominent politicians from the PPP, the PML-N, and (both?) their vote banks, it soon bec~me clear t?at Khan could not win enough votes to form a government WIthout~laYIng coalition politics, which he declined to do, With Khan's prospects dImmed, the court returned to relative quiescence until the sudden arriv~l, inJa~~ary 2013, of Muhammad Tahirul Qadri, who had ties to two preVlo~s~Ihtary rulers, Mohammad Zia ulHaq and Musharraf. While few PakIstanIShad even heard of the Canadian religious scholar, he managed to m~rsh~l massive crowds to protest the PPP's purported corruption, Many P~kISt;~IS Wondered about the provenance of the "martyrdomproof cont.a mer III which he moved about. The fortified mobile residence offered r~sIstance to high velocity ammunition and imprOVised explosive devices; even PakistanI' I' d liti did not have such secure conveyances. po Ice an po I icrans I Paki , di f)'ad " .. . fu di d access to istan s me ia "<.l n s rapid nse, extensive n ing, an prOVidestrong evidence that he also enjoyed the support of the army.
Qadri and his followers camped out in front of th parliament, and insisted that the government end its term early to form a caretaker government in consultation with him and the army. lthou h many of his complaints were reasonable, his methods were outrageous. Many Pakistanis feared that the army planned to use the eklong confrontation to justify a coup, but such a move was never likely. Instead, the army was biding time using an unelected and unelectable Canadian citizen to bring the current government to its knees. It was no coincid nee that the Supreme Court took the opportunity to order the arr t of the prime minister as the Qadri drama unfolded.
Pakistanis gave a deep sigh of relief when it was all over. The popular interpretation of these events is that the politicians managed to sideline Qadri and undercut a coup in the making. In fact, what Qadri managed was a soft coup on behalf of the army. Qadri coerced from the government an agreement to dissolve the parliament before March 1 ,even though the parliament's term was set to expire on March 18. As a Canadian citizen, Qadri had no right to demand that a popularly elected government dissolve prematurely. Yet, with the support of his allies in uniform, he was able to dictate terms. This episode-and the bizarre accord it produced-tainted the legitimacy of the 2013 electoral transition by demonstrating that the army still held democracy's leash. The government dissolved on March 16.
The army executed a similar drama in the early days of the newly-elected Nawaz Sharif government in 2014. The army was disquieted by his election for several reasons. First, Pakistanis were starting to get a taste for democratic transfers of power. Although the general election that brought Sharif to office was not pristine, it was the first time that one democratically-elected administration had completed its term and then handed power over to another democratically-elected administration. As noted above, throughout the 1990s, the military had always cut elected officials' tenures short. Analysts were hopeful that, as democracy became more routine, the military would have an increasingly difficult time intervening with coups.
Furthermore, it was troubling for the army that the Sharif government won a solid majority. Given this position of relative strength, Sharif sought to. assert some. modicum of civilian control over the country's over-gro;vn military. Shanf assumed personal oversight of the defense and foreign affairs portfolios, which had previously been left to the military. He was vocal about pursuing better ties with India and spoke of abandoning the ld ' " age-o strategy of cultivating terrorism in Afghanistan for "strategic depth again t India. He also promised to negotiate with the Pakistani Taliban which has avaged the country for over a decade. The army, for its own rea .ons wanted to launch a selective operation against the group in Pakistan s orth aziristan area. Finally, Sharif has insisted on trying u harraf for treason. 13 The army's generals understood that a case against their fanner 1 ader would put them all on trial. All three of these objectives undermined core army equities.
Whereas previously, the army could rely upon a complicit Supreme Court ju tice th new Supreme Court Justice, Nasir-ul-Mulk, had little to no appetite for th activism of his predecessor. Pakistani analysts suspect that army re-mobilized the street drama that it had choreographed during the PPP government; namely, by supporting months-long protests in the capital led by Imran Khan and Mustafa Qadri. Again, Pakistanis feared a coup. Instead, army chief, Raheel Sharif, "agreed to mediate in a bitter stand-off between the government, Khan and Qadri-who [brought] thousands of their followers to Islamabad.'?' The army used this drama to coerce awaz Sharif's acquiescence to the army's preferences and forego his own goals. Additionally, throughout Nawaz Sharif's tenure, Sharif made various overtures toward India, each of which were followed by terrorist attacks in India by Pakistan-sponsored terrorist groups (i.e. LeT and JeM), This chilled Indian enthusiasm for Sharif's overtures. , The persistent ability of the army to restrain the prime minister is Illustrated by a cluster of events in October 2016, when Cyril Almeida, a senior Pakistani journalist, reported in Dawn (an English-language daily newspaper) that Pakistan's civilian leadership told the military that it should "act against militants or face international isolation."15Almeida indicated that the civilian leadership had a heated exchange with the ar~y against the backdrop of intensifying conflict with India. After a stunnIng assault by Pakistan-backed terrorists associated with LeT had taken place on an Indian military base in Uri (Kashmir). More generally, Almeida's article suggested that Nawaz Sharif was trying to "push ba k again t the military to gain some space in the country's defense policy and foreign affairs. 16 Reportedly, this move by the awaz Sharif go emm nt temmed from growing pressure from China, which began pushing back on Pakistan's request to undermine India's effort to ban Jaishe ohammad e ) chief Masood Azhar, at the United ations (U ) by placing t chnical holds on the move in the Security Council Oamal 2016). h prime mini ter's younger brother and Punjab Chief Minister, hahbaz harif complained to the Inter-Services Intelligence (lSI) chief General Akhtar that whenever the police detain persons with terrorist group ties th I larks to free them. Nawaz Sharif also asked the lSI chief that "fre h attemp be made to conclude the Pathankot investigation and restart the stall d umbai attacksrelated trials in a Rawalpindi antiterrorism court.?" In addition a PML-N parliamentarian Rana Muhammad Afzal asked, "Which e g i Hafiz aeed [LeT's leader] laying for us that we are nurturing him?" during a meeting of the National Assembly Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs."
The response of the civilian and military leadership to lm ida s article is telling of who actually wields the power in Pakistan over security policy, and those domestic policies that inform them. The civilian government responded to the report by repeatedly denying its accuracy denouncing it as an "amalgamation of fiction and fabrication', and by adding Almeida's name on the Exit Control List (ECL), a move which barred him from foreign travel. 19 Pakistanis believe that this decision was made not by Nawaz Sharif's government, but by the army. While the army may have tolerated the civilian government's efforts to assert itself in national security affairs, it was not going to endure such a challenge being made public.~o Moreover, to underscore that the army and the lSI it controls is in charge of these matters, the lSI chief refused on multiple occasions to attend . . , "Almeida, "Exclusive: Act against militants" andJamal "After Dawn." 2jamal, "After Dawn." , parliam ntary me tings scheduled to address the India-Pakistan situation after Le attack on the Indian army base at Uri. 21 From the army's point of ie civilian demands for the lSI to keep away from law enforcement's efforts to a t against militants are tantamount to conceding to New Delhi's demands. Thi reflects the long-held strategic position of the army and the I I of cultivating these groups as tools of foreign policy, irrespective of the domestic a ts th Y may impose.
Leadership Changes: What Can We Expect?
at can analy ts expect from the newly-appointed army chief, Bajwa? First I patentl reject the interpretation that Sharif appointed him because he would be more amenable to civilian govemance. 22 Sharif made this mistake in 1 8 when he forced General Karamat to retire and replaced him with Musharraf, who ousted Sharif in his 1999 coup. Moreover, there is no evidence to support the assertion that Bajwa is any more democratic than his predecessors. Instead, I assess that his appointment reflects the shared views of the civilian and military leadership about the current threats facing Pakistan: namely the importance of making progress on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and managing increasingly fraught ties with India as it explores options to punish Pakistan for its persistent use of terrorism in India.
Bajwa has extensive experience managing Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan affairs, as he had served thrice in Pakistan's X Corps, which is responsible for the area along the Line of Control with India. The X Corps also includes the Force Command Northern Areas in Gilgit. Bajwa's experience in confronting India in this terrain will be a natural benefit, given India's recent increased assertiveness in the wake of Uri. Moreover, Bajwa's experience is doubly important because residents of Gilgit-Baltistan,.w~o fear displacement and environmental degradation, are not enthusIastic about CPEC, which is anchored in the north with ground lines of 'Ibid 2~. • .
• to him as "Taliban Khan." While Imran Khan has been useful to the army as a tool to weaken Sharif, he is too unpredictable and unreliable to be the army's choice for prime minister. It is my assessment that the army will be very active in manipulating the electoral outcome by interfering selectively in voter registration and iSSUingidentity cards, frustrating the ability of candidates to run, orchestrating party defections, and manipulating the security environment.
The most likely desired outcome would be a fractious coalitiongovernment that resulted from the deeply flawed 2008 elections, during which I served as an election observer. In the 2013 elections, in which I was also an observer, foreign observers had difficulty deploying due to the security environment. I see no reason why the 2018 elections would be a "Ahmedis suffer extreme persecution in Pakistan hecause they do not accept the ordinal finahty of the prophethood. Worse than being considered nonbelievers (kufar, pI. of kafir), they are considered to be apostates (murtadeen, pI. of murtad). In 1974, under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Ahmedis were declared to be non-Muslim. Given this law and the perception that they are murtadeen, they can be punished with death if they refer to themselves as Muslims (I.e., call their places of worship "mosques," say Muslim prayers, etc.). more propitious environment for election observation missions. For all of the reason already noted, whoever becomes the prime minister is largely immaterial for questions germane to U.S. national security interests.
Implications for US Policy
International observers tend to look at the appointment of new army chiefsand e en new prime ministers with the expectation that some things will change, perhaps for the better. Unfortunately, there is very little scope for such optimism. The strategic interests of the army have been remarkably durable over several decades, and the assets it has cultivated to manage them (militancy under a nuclear umbrella and rent seeking based upon the country being too dangerous to fail) have been similarly enduring. Thus, army chiefs differ very little in their appraisal of Pakistan's goals or in the tools that they apply to achieve them. Over time, civilian leaders have consistently demonstrated very little ability to affect change for at least two reasons. One, most civilian leaders tend to share many of the views of the army as do the voters who elect them. Second, when civilian leaders do desire different outcomes or to use tools other than those honed by the army, they are undermined by the army, which controls most eversof influence and which enjoys more influence over opinion-shaping Instruments in the country. In summation, it is my assessment that the United States shou~d not anticipate major changes for the better from the appointment of Bajwa or from whatever government the 2018 election produces. In fact, under Bajwa, Pakistan could be even more aggressive because his personal and professional stakes are much greater.
